








The Importance of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory:




	 Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. Further, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act towards friends and family. I argue against this that though Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, it nonetheless requires we give special treatment to friends and family because of their relationships with us.

I. Introduction
Care ethics developed, in part, as a response to impartial moral theories and their supposed inadequacy to help us to fully examine and act appropriately in our personal relationships—the relationships we have with friends and family.<1> One of the most recent presentations of this argument can be found in Virginia Held’s The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. As part of her presentation of a normative care ethics, Held explains why care ethicists find impartial moral theories, like Kantian moral theory, inadequate for examining situations when personal relationships are involved. Some Kantian philosophers, including Marcia Baron, have attempted to address this claim. Baron has argued that we should think of impartial moral theory as having two levels. While impartiality is used to determine our moral principles at a higher level, Baron claims this does not require us to omit partiality at the lower level of individual actions. So, even though we may follow an impartial moral theory, we can still perform actions that benefit our friends and family. Held contends that this (and other Kantian arguments of the same vein) do not go far enough to address the pressing question:  What happens when the motives of caring for a loved one and our obligation to obey an impartial principle do conflict? If our moral theory is an impartial theory, Held claims, we will always be required to act in ways that are consistent with impartiality, even at the lower level. 
Kantian moral theory is often described as an impartial theory. Though many philosophers have given different descriptions of what impartiality is, ranging from equal treatment of everyone to equal consideration of everyone, the piece of the definition important to critics of impartial moral theory is that it is something that either prevents us from having the close connection we think personal relationships entail or, less drastically, it stands in the way to some degree of our giving beneficial treatment to those in personal relationships with us.<2> Held’s position seems to be the latter. 
To highlight this conflict and the differing perspectives of Kantian moral theory and care ethics, Held presents the example of a father who has a young child and is a teacher. He is especially skilled at helping troubled youths succeed academically (2007, 97). This father must make the decision whether to spend more time with his students or more time with his son. Using the impartial reasoning inherent in Kantian moral theory, Held thinks the man will decide that he should spend more time with his students: 
Reasoning as an abstract agent as such, I should act on moral rules that all could accept from a perspective of impartiality. Those rules recommend that we treat all persons equally, including our children, with respect to exercising our professional skills, and that when we have special skills we should use them for the benefit of all persons equally. For example, a teacher should not favor his own child if his child happens to be one of his students. If one has the abilities and has had the social advantages to become a teacher, one should exercise those skills when they are needed, especially when they are seriously needed (98-99). 

Because the father has a special skill at helping troubled youths to succeed, under her definition of what all impartial moral theories require (benefiting all persons equally), Held thinks the father would reason that he should spend more time with his students. Because Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, it would also require the father to spend more time with his students rather than with his child. 
As opposed to starting from the perspective of impartiality required by impartial moral theories, care ethics starts from the perspective of care. “The moral question an ethic of care takes as central is not—what, if anything do I (we) owe to others? but rather—How can I (we) best meet my (our) caring responsibilities?” (Tronto 1993, 137). Nearly all of us have benefited from another’s care and recognize that care as having fundamental value (Held 2007, 17 and Noddings 2003, 5). “Ethics of Care starts with the moral claims of particular others, for instance, of one’s child, whose claims can be compelling regardless of universal principles” (Held 2007, 10). Rather than starting with impartial moral principles, “[c]aring seems to involve taking the concerns and the needs of the other as the basis for action” (Tronto 1993, 105). According to Held, if the father examines the situation from the perspective of care ethics, he will come to a different conclusion: 
From this perspective, his relationship with his child is of enormous and irreplaceable value. He thinks that out of concern for this particular relationship he should spend more time with his child. He experiences the relationship as one of love, trust, and loyalty and thinks that in the case being considered he should subordinate such other considerations as exercising his professional skills to this relationship. He thinks he should free himself from extra work to help his child feel the trust and encouragement from which his development will benefit, even if this conflicts with impartial morality (99).

For care ethics, then, choosing to benefit one’s child (or presumably, any family member or friend) instead of acting in a way that benefits all people equally, which Held claims Kantian moral theory as an impartial theory would require, is not a problem. In her contrast of the decisions made the perspective of care and from the perspective of Kantian theory, Held assumes that the impartiality in Kantian theory requires us not to take into consideration our personal relationships when we are making moral decisions. The consequence of this is that we are required to treat all people, including our children, in the same way. The fact that a child is my child or that someone is in a personal relationship with me does not, Held thinks, make a difference in the moral consideration of a Kantian. Though Held uses the relationship between a father and his child in her example, the basic claim seems to be that Kantian moral theory requires us to give equal consideration or treatment to everyone, including family members and friends. 
Though Held is the one of the latest to make this claim about Kantian moral theory, she is not the only care ethicist to object to the impartiality in Kantian theory.<3> Though I examine Held’s recent explanation of the objection, I intend my arguments to apply to the similar characterization of Kantian moral theory offered by other care ethicists. The claim that Kantian moral theory requires us to give equal consideration or treatment to everyone, including friends and family, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of Kantian moral theory. But even when we understand that Kantian moral theory does not require us to give equal treatment to everyone, there is still the question raised by care ethics of whether actions done for family and friends have moral value in Kantian moral theory as they do in care ethics, or whether such actions are simply morally permissible. I will argue that, understood correctly, Kantian moral theory not only allows but requires that we give special consideration to family and friends. Thus, such actions are not just morally permissible, they also have moral value. 
 
II. Impartiality in Kantian Moral Theory
Held assumes that Kantian moral theory requires us to treat everyone, including our children, equally. In response to this kind of objection, Marcia Baron argues that this is not necessarily a feature of all impartial moral theories. A better way to understand what impartial moral theory, or at least Kantian moral theory, requires of us is to understand impartiality as consisting of two levels. What is required of us by Kantian theory, Baron argues, is impartiality at the level where general principles are chosen (1991, 843). Impartiality is not necessarily required at the level of our direct actions. We can show partiality in our actions as long as our general principles approve partiality in those situations (843). We can act in ways that honor our parents and show partiality for them, for example, because we can see good reasons for anyone to adhere to the principle, “Honor thy mother and father” (842). While impartiality gives guiding principles for our actions, it is not a position or viewpoint Kantian moral theory requires us to undertake in order to decide which action is the right action.<4>
Held finds Baron’s response to be lacking because dividing impartiality into levels still does not give the proper place to the relationship in question. For the impartialist, or Kantian, the reason I honor my father is because I can see reasons why any child should honor her father. For the partialist, or care ethicists, the reason I honor my father is because he is my father who helped raise me over the years. Whether other children should honor their fathers is irrelevant. I honor my father because of our connection, not because it is appropriate for any child to honor her father. The focus is on the particular relationship between the individuals, not on moral principles. Though we can make some generalizations about the value of care (the value of being a good father, for example), Held claims that the difference between care ethics and an impartial moral theory is what gives rise to value for the theory (2007, 80). For the care ethics,  “[i]t would be the particular persons involved and the relation between them, rather than the general principle, that would be the source of the honoring” (80). So, it is the father and his relationship with his child that is the source of the honor rather than a principle that says all children should honor their parents. 
A different way to interpret the impartiality Kantian moral theory requires is presented by Cynthia Stark. Rather than making a distinction between levels of impartiality, Stark argues that the impartiality in Kantian moral theory gives us a standard of rightness rather than a way to determine which action is right. That is, the impartiality in Kantian moral theory tells us what kinds of actions are right, not which action is the right one. Looking at Baron’s example of honoring one’s parents, under Stark’s interpretation of impartiality, it is not necessarily the case that we need to be able to adopt a principle that everyone should honor his or her parents. Rather, it should be the case that honoring one’s parents is the kind of action that is morally right. Stark explains this by looking at the Categorical Imperative, or Kant’s supreme principle of morality, in the Formulation of Humanity as an End (FHE), which states that one should “[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” (Kant 1993, 429). Some philosophers interpret the FHE’s requirement we treat humanity in ourselves and others as an end and never as a mere means as saying that only the abstract features of other persons, or the features that we all have in common, are important. From Held’s explanation of what Kantian moral theory would require of the father in her example, she seems to share this view. 
Stark claims that this interpretation of the FHE is incorrect. As Stark points out, if one thinks the FHE requires us to look at all other persons as abstract individuals in order to respect them because of their humanity, then it looks as if what respect requires of us is that we take an impartial attitude towards all people when making moral decisions. But if we understand the FHE as giving us a standard of rightness, then we understand the FHE as pointing out that all morally right actions will show respect for the humanity in others. While it is true that we all have moral worth because of our shared humanity, this does not mean that respecting others requires us only to pay attention to their rational agency. Thinking that this is what is required is actually a mistake:
Kant maintains that persons have what he calls absolute or unconditional worth. We have this worth in virtue of the fact that we are autonomous rational agents. Our special worth, conferred upon us by our rational agency, obliges people, including ourselves, to treat and regard us with respect. Particular and idiosyncratic features of our character, emotional constitution or social position, not to mention of our bodies, are, as far as our moral status is concerned, irrelevant. The humanity in persons, in short, is the justificatory ground of the principle of respect for persons. However, while it is true, on Kant’s account, that I must respect others because they are rational agents, it does not follow that in respecting them I must pay attention only to their rational agency. Indeed, in most cases it would be impossible to fulfill one’s obligation to respect someone without attending to her particular situation: her needs, concerns, aspirations and personal history (Stark 1997, 483-484, emphasis in original).

The Categorical Imperative in the form of the FHE does not tell us which action is the right action. Rather, it tells us what kind of action is the right action—an action that shows respect for the agent. In actually performing an action that shows respect for the agent, we will most likely have to take into account particular details about that agent.
	Stark’s interpretation of impartiality as giving us a standard of rightness would most likely still not satisfy Held. Stark stresses that acting appropriately requires us to pay attention to the particular characteristics of individuals in our actions towards them in order to show fulfill our obligation of respect. In that case, honoring my mother or father because it is my mother or father and because she or he, as an individual, deserves my honor, is consistent with Kantian respect. The reason I honor my parents is because they deserve honor. It does not have to be the case that I think there are good reasons for a principle of honoring one’s parents. It does have to be the case that, in showing honor for my parents, I do so in ways that that are consistent with my respecting them as individuals. 
Held might still take issue with the fact that the underlying requirement is that the honor I give my parents, in some sense, must still measure up to the Kantian requirement of respect. Though I take my parents’ particular characteristics into account in the way I show honor, for this to be a moral action, my actions must be the kind of actions that are consistent with showing respect. According to Held, the problem is that actions like honoring my parents are still required to be consistent with the categorical imperative: “Lower level rules may be shorthand derivations, but if they are inconsistent with the categorical imperative, it is unlikely that, to the Kantian, we should ever follow them. Hence, for the impartialist, impartiality always trumps partiality after all, rather than genuinely allowing it” (Held 2007, 79). So, even if we show honor towards our parents, the problem is that showing such honor has to be consistent with the categorical imperative. The problem with Stark’s interpretation, then, is that even if we show honor for our parents, we do so because it is a way of showing them respect, which we have a duty to show to everyone. This differs from acting from care because “[a]n important aspect of care is how it expresses our attitudes and relationships” (30). As Held describes it, morally valuable care has two components. First, “care is a practice involving the work of care-giving” (36). Care is also a value: “for actual practices of care we need care as a value to pick out the appropriate cluster of moral considerations, such as sensitivity, trust, and mutual concern” (38). The problem for Held, then, is that under Stark’s interpretation, the reason for giving honor to our parents must still be consistent with the categorical imperative. If it is not consistent, we cannot show honor for them. For care ethicists, the honor given to one’s parents is important because it is an expression of relationship and the connection between those specific individuals. This is what gives the action moral value. 
Although Held and other care ethicists are correct in thinking that there are differences between some of the fundamental values of Kantian moral theory and care ethics, they are incorrect in thinking that a Kantian cannot accept that specific actions done because of personal relationships themselves have moral value.<5> An examination of Kant’s description of our duty of beneficence shows that Kant thinks we are not always required to act impartially in the sense that we are not always required to weigh the interests of strangers and those of friends and family equally. There are cases where we can choose to benefit a friend and family member over a stranger because the person is our friend or family member. As Kant says about our duty of beneficence in the Metaphysics of Morals, “in acting [beneficently] I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more than another)” (Kant 1996, 6:452). Kant also recognizes that parents specifically have obligations to their children because of the relationship between the parents and the children. He says that spouses have obligations to each other because of their relationship and he also describes the obligations that friends have to each other because of their friendship.<6> Furthermore, a Kantian can argue that further examination of what the FHE and respect require of us shows that Kantian moral theory requires us to give special consideration to friends and family. We give them this consideration because they are our friends and family, just as friends and family receive special consideration and treatment in care ethics because of their relationship to us.
A. The importance of context
In her explanation of how the father would go about deciding whether to spend time with his child or his students, Held claims that the “rules” of Kantian moral theory “recommend that we treat all personals equally, including our children” (98). There are two important points to note here. First, many Kantians have argued that what Kantian moral theory requires is that we show a commitment to acting on moral principles, not on following a particular strict set of rules.<7> Showing a commitment to acting on moral principles itself does not necessarily require that we treat all people equally, as we can see when we examine the Kantian principle of beneficence. Part of expressing our commitment means taking into account the details of situations when we act on that commitment.<8> Kant gives an example of this in his discussion of how someone who is rich should show commitment to a principle of beneficence: 
Someone who is rich (has abundant means for the happiness of others, i.e., means in excess of his own ends) should hardly even regard beneficence as a meritorious duty on his part, even though he also puts others under obligation by it….He must also carefully avoid any appearance of intending to bind the other by it; for if he showed that he wanted to put the other under an obligation…it would not be a true benefit that he rendered him. Instead, he must show that he is himself put under obligation by the other’s acceptance or honored by it, hence that the duty is merely something that he owes (1996, 6:453).
As Kant points out in this passage, it is not enough to simply act beneficently in order to fulfill one’s duty. How one acts in fulfilling that duty is an important part of fulfilling the duty. In this case, to truly act on a principle of beneficence, the benefactor must act in such a way that the person benefited does not feel that the benefactor is intending to put her under obligation. We might be tempted to think that this restriction would apply to the father in Held’s example in the same way. That is, when the father fulfills his duties towards his child, he must be careful not to let the child feel as though he intends to bind the child by his actions. Rather, he should act towards the child in such a way that he shows that “the duty is merely something that he owes.” But acting in such a way would seem to conflict with some of the father’s other duties, as discussed below.
Part of taking context into account is knowing who is involved in the situations in which we find ourselves. While Held is right that Kantian moral theory would require the father not to favor his child if his child were one of his students, she is not correct in assuming that Kantian moral theory would require that the father spend his extra time helping his students instead of spending it with his child. The father’s question about how to spend his “extra” time seems to fall under the category of beneficent action. He is not required by his job to spend the extra time with his students. Rather, he is deciding how to use the extra time he has to benefit some person or persons—either his child or his students. The principle of beneficence Kant gives does not mandate that we always devote our resources to the least well-off, nor does it necessarily exclude giving preference to those in personal relationships with us, as noted earlier. Rather, it says that “in acting I can, without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more than another)” (Kant 1996, 6:452). So, I can choose to do more for my family and friends because they are my family and friends without violating the impartiality of the principle of beneficence. Just because we should be aware of all the ways in which we could act beneficently does not mean that we should treat those in personal relationships with us and those who are strangers equally: we are not required to do the same things for both. In this case, the father could choose to spend his extra time with his child and there is nothing morally wrong with such a decision under Kantian moral theory. 
B. Duties of parents to children
The second point to note about Held’s example is that Kant does actually spend some time in the Metaphysics of Morals outlining the duties that accompany particular relationships. As noted earlier, he addresses duties between spouses, duties of parents to children, and duties of friends. Since the example Held gives is about a parent and a child, here I discuss only the duties of parents to children.<9>
In his discussion of the rights of domestic society (marriage), Kant includes a discussion of the responsibilities of parents to their children. “Children, as persons, have by their procreation an original innate (not acquired) right to the care of their parents until they are able to look after themselves” (Kant 1996, 6:280). We might interpret “care” here to mean only meeting the physical necessities of the child. But Kant says that parents have the responsibility not only to feed and care for their children but to educate them both pragmatically (in terms of life skills) and morally (1996, 6:281). Though he does not say exactly how we are to do this, one can assume that part of this responsibility will include giving extra time and attention to one’s children. Contrary to Held’s claim, then, the father from the earlier example would be justified under Kantian moral theory in spending more time with his child because of the duties he has to his child. 
A potential problem for this answer is similar to the problem with the question of why it is one gives honor to one’s father: under the care ethics perspective, the father wants to spend time with his child because of the personal relationship they have, while under the Kantian picture, the father should spend time with his child because of the obligation he has. But it is also the case that the father under the Kantian picture may want to spend time with his child. Furthermore, the reasons why the father wants to spend time with his child under the care ethics explanation that Held presents (because the father views the relationship as being one of love, trust, and loyalty and because he thinks his child will benefit developmentally from their spending time together) could also be the reasons the Kantian father wants to spend time with his child. Learning about love, trust, and loyalty are important aspects of moral development and development generally. This relates to a potential worry raised earlier: in his description of how the rich benefactor ought to act, Kant says that the benefactor ought to act in such a way that he does not cause the person benefited to feel as though the benefactor’s actions have created an obligation on the part of the person benefited. The benefactor should act in such a way that shows the person benefited that the benefactor’s actions are “merely something that he owes” (Kant 1996, 6:453). But if a parent were to act in such a way that the child thought that the parent’s actions were simply the product of duty and merely something that the parent owed the child, then we could say that there is an important way in which the parent is hindering the moral and practical education of the child. Children need a loving and supportive environment that will enable them to take the risks associated with learning different skills. There are also important ways in which the love we experience from those close to us helps us understand what it would mean to love others in the sense of fulfilling our duty of beneficence. If this is the case, then it seems as though there is an important way in which a parent, including the father in Held’s example, who acts as though what he does for his child is merely a duty is not meeting his duty of helping the child to develop. 
The main difference, then, is not in the action specified by the outcome of the analysis. The person who is a committed Kantian and parent can justify spending time with his child for many of the same reasons that can be given by a parent who takes up the perspective of care ethics. Both can justify spending extra time with their children because of the relationship the parents have with their child—the child is their child. The difference is in why the parent is spending time with his child. For the Kantian, the parent has a duty to spend time with his child because the child is his child. For the care ethicist, the father spends time with his child because the child is his child and he values their relationship and the development of the child. But this is not to say that the Kantian father cannot act in a caring manner towards his child while fulfilling his duties as a father, nor is it to say that a father can adequately fulfill his duties as a father without acting in a caring manner. 
The difference, then, seems to be in the moral value of the action. For the care ethicist, the father’s action of spending time with his child has moral value because it is a caring action, an action done in a caring manner and done because of the relationship between the father and his child. For the Kantian, the father has a duty to care for his child and to spend time with his child, and the father has a duty to act in a caring way towards his child as part of fulfilling his duties. But there still might be a difference between care ethics and Kantian moral theory when we are looking at other relationships between family and friends. Kant mentions care explicitly when talking about the relationship of parents to children, but he does not mention care when discussing the duties of spouses or of friends. Is there a way, then, that we can understand care in the sense that it is used in care ethics as being part of Kantian moral theory in these relationships? That is, is there a way in which care has moral value in Kantian moral theory? I argue that care between those in personal relationships does have moral value in Kantian moral theory, and we can see this when we examine what Kantian respect and the FHE require of us. Understood correctly, the FHE requires that we give special consideration to family members and friends. This consideration is similar to the kind of care that care ethics requires we show to family and friends in that it expresses love, trust, and concern, and we show it to those in personal relationships with us because of the relationship.

III. Care in Kantian moral theory
To understand why Kantian moral theory requires us to show care to those in personal relationships with us, it is important to examine also the Categorical Imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End (FHE) and what the FHE requires of us. As explained earlier, in her explanation of the FHE and its connection to respect, Stark argues that in showing respect for someone, we are required to take into account the characteristics of the person: “her needs, concerns, aspirations, and personal history” (1997, 484), including, presumably, the history of her relationship with us. Looking at the FHE in this way will help us understand not only how parents should treat their children but also how family members generally and friends should treat each other as well. Such an understanding will also help us to address the bigger criticism of Kantian moral theory’s inability to tell us what to do in any personal relationship, not just parental relationships. 
A. Understanding the FHE
As stated earlier, the FHE requires us to “[a]ct in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” As Stark explains, this formulation of the Categorical Imperative is often thought to be a principle of respect. But to really understand what the FHE requires of us, particularly with regard to personal relationships, we will need more explanation of the FHE. 
In his discussion of the FHE, Kant argues that rational nature is an end in itself (1993, 429). Ends are those goals that rational agents set for themselves as things they intend to accomplish (428), and means are the ways that rational agents accomplish the goals that they have as ends. According to Kant, “rational beings are called persons inasmuch as their nature already makes them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something which is not to be used merely as a means and hence there is imposed thereby a limit on all arbitrary use of such beings, which are thus objects of respect” (428). Because human beings are rational beings by nature, all humans are also ends in themselves (428). To treat a rational agent as an end is to show respect for that agent’s capacity to set ends for herself and to act on those ends. 
While we are to treat others as ends and never as mere means, this does not mean that we are never allowed to use others as a means, or a way to achieve our ends. We routinely use others as means. For example, when I buy groceries, I use the clerk at the check out as a means to purchase food. What I may not do, however, is use others as mere means. In order to avoid using someone as a mere means, my actions should show respect for her autonomy and rationality. In the case of the store clerk, the way that I treat her during our interaction should show respect for her. In many cases, this will simply mean being polite, though there may be circumstances where more is required. If the individual can agree with my end, and the way I am using her is consistent with showing respect for her, then my action is morally permissible. If the way that I use the person does not show respect for the individual—if I am rude to the store clerk, for example—then I have used the person as a mere means and my action is morally impermissible. 
In the FHE, Kant says that we must act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as an end. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. believes that “humanity” for Kant in this context includes the capacities associated with the rationality that all human beings share, including the ability we have to choose and to set our own ends (1992, 40). This includes our ability to set and act on principles (Kant 1993, 412, 414-415). Part of our humanity, then, is our ability to set ends for ourselves and to take the steps required to obtain those ends. 
	Though it may appear that Kant’s discussion here requires us only to respect the humanity, or rational nature, in others, as Stark points out, this does not mean that in showing respect for them, I show respect only for their rational nature. In discussing this passage, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. makes a similar point: respecting humans as rational requires concern for their physical and emotional well-being (2002, 77). Our emotional well-being is greatly affected by our personal relationships. Because such relationships are an important part our lives, affecting our development and our view of ourselves as people in the world and as moral agents, developing and maintaining our personal relationships is an end that we have. These relationships are our ends in the sense that we work to maintain and to promote them by doing various acts for friends and family. Our friends and family members also have our relationship with them as ends. These relationships are part of the life projects that we have, whether they are relationships that we have specifically chosen for ourselves, like friendships, or relationships that occur because of family connections, like relationships with parents, spouses, or siblings. Because our personal relationships are ends that we have, respecting someone’s autonomy might well require we perform some actions for those we know well which we would not perform for strangers. 
Given that every person is a rational agent and deserves to be treated as an end and not as a mere means, we can see why some people might think that allowing us to take into account our personal relationships with others when making moral decisions would be problematic. If the father always chooses to go home to his child and never spends any extra time helping his students or treats all of his students the same, then we might think there is a way in which he is not treating his students as ends because he is not showing proper respect for them. He is not showing proper respect because he is not taking into consideration the unique characteristics of his students and their needs. 
However, if we look at why we think duties in personal relationships are different from duties in general, then we might conclude that there are times when, if we consider the needs of the people in personal relationships with us to be of equal importance to the needs of strangers, we are not treating those in personal relationships with us as ends. Part of the respect we owe to others is to treat them as people who are capable of choosing a life plan and directing their lives according to that plan. In the case of children, part of the respect we owe them is to help them develop the skills and confidence they will need in order to be capable of choosing a life plan and directing their lives according to that plan as they mature. When we are not in a personal relationship with someone, we are justified in treating them in a way that is consistent with what most rational agents would generally want. But when we do have a personal relationship with someone and so we know and are involved to some degree in her life plan, we need to treat her in a way that takes those facts into account. To ignore this is to ignore that she is an agent capable of choosing her own life plan, including us in that plan and directing her life according to that plan. To ignore our relationship with a person in our interaction with that person is to fail to show respect for her ability to set her own ends. In the case of the father and his child, by ignoring his child in order to spend all his extra time with his students, the father fails to fulfill his duty as a parent. He also fails to treat his child as an end because he is failing to take into account his relationship with his child and what it requires of him aside from providing the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter. 
If, as I have argued, the FHE requires us to give special consideration to those in personal relationships with us because our relationships are ends that we have, then personal relationships will play a much bigger role in the Kantian agent’s consideration of what to do in a particular situation than Held describes and what care ethicists have assumed. This is the case not just with one’s children, but also with other family members and friends. It is also true, though, that the simple fact that a friend or family member is involved in a situation will not always be the deciding factor. It seems as though care ethicists would agree with this point, particularly given the recent emphasis of care ethicists on giving an explanation for a global responsibility to care.<10> In this way, Kantian moral theory and care ethics are similar.
B. An Objection: acting from duties to everyone vs. acting from care
Even though I have argued that Kantian moral theory requires us to give special consideration to our friends and family members in particular situations, a care ethicist may still object to the argument by pointing out that, even though care ethics and Kantian moral theory may both require that we act similarly towards friends and family, actions done from care are what have moral value for care ethicists, while actions that show respect have moral value for a Kantian. For care ethicists, care is understood as a contextual response to a particular individual in a particular relationship and a particular situation. This kind of specific response is part of what makes an action a caring action and gives it moral value. For a Kantian, respect is something that we owe to everyone because of the categorical imperative. We have a duty to act in ways that show respect for others. Actions that are consistent with our acting on a principle of respect are the kinds of actions that have moral value. The important difference between the two theories, then, is our reason for acting: are we acting from care or are we acting from respect?
Though the two theories give us different reasons for acting, the difference is not so great as some care ethicists might think. Kantians do start from the idea of duty and obligation, but not all care ethicists reject the idea of obligation as a starting point. Following Nel Noddings, care ethicist Rita Manning, for example, speaks of our obligation to care for others (1992, 69-73). Held and Tronto speak of a responsibility to care rather than an obligation, but they still recognize that caring is something that we should do for others, including but not limited to friends and family.<11> Furthermore, caring is also something we have a responsibility or obligation to do for friends and family even in situations where we may not necessarily feel like caring for them. As Noddings notes, 
there are times, even in the closest human relations, when the feeling associated with natural caring—“I must”—does not arise spontaneously. Then, if we value ourselves as carers, we summon ethical caring—a dutiful form of caring that resembles a Kantian ethical attitude. On such occasions we respond as carers because we want to uphold our ideal of ourselves as carers (2002, 29-30).

There will be times in any relationship where I do not particularly feel like caring for my friend of family member. Framing the reasons I have for still acting in a caring manner towards them as an obligation or responsibility does not in any way imply that the relationship is not important to me or that I do not love my friend or family member. Rather, it is precisely because I love her and because the relationship is important to me that I continue to act in a caring manner towards her, even though the affective component of care may be missing on this occasion. As Kant notes, love cannot be commanded (1997, 27:53 and 27:413) and at times we act to help friends and family out of a sense of obligation that arises from the fact that we are in a relationship with them: “Well-doing from love arises from the heart; but well-doing from obligation arises from principles of the understanding. A man may act well to his wife, for example, from love; but where inclination has already departed it is done from obligation” (1997, 27:413).
Kantian moral theory does focus on our obligations to all others, including our duty of respect. Though this duty often serves to put boundaries around our actions towards others, it does not preclude acting in a way that is caring. In fact, to show proper respect for another person, one must act in a caring manner.<12> To truly accept the other person’s end of our relationship, I must act in a way that shows that I care about the other person and our relationship. To show care, I have to be attentive and sensitive to the other person and her needs. These are the characteristics Held thinks are involved in care (2007, 39). While respect might seem like an odd starting place when considering how we should treat friends and family, particularly in how we should care for them, respect here serves mostly to place restraints on what we do for family members and friends. Respect is a necessary part of care, but it is not a replacement for it. It also helps us to remember that, though our family and friends are very important to us, there are others who deserve respect and should factor into our considerations. It reminds us that our family and friends, though important to us, are not the only individuals who deserve our moral concern.
In both care ethics and Kantian moral theory, actions that show care for friends and family take into consideration the context of situation and he relationship between the individuals involved. As I have argued, it is also true that such actions have moral value not only under care ethics, but also under Kantian moral theory. The kind of care that is of moral value in care ethics is also of moral value in Kantian moral theory. Even though Kantian moral theory is an impartial moral theory, the impartiality in it does not require us to treat everyone the same, nor does it require us to give everyone the same consideration. Rather, it requires us to recognize that all individuals are morally important and that we cannot dismiss certain groups of people simply because they are not in personal relationships with us. When we are thinking about how we should treat our friends and family, Kantian moral theory requires us to treat them in a way that shows that they and our relationships with them matter to us. We do this by being attentive and sensitive to their needs. The same attentiveness and sensitivity is required by care ethics in response to family and friends. For both theories, the relationships we have with friends and family are a central reason for our actions towards them. Given this, care ethicists do not have a reason to object to Kantian moral theory on the grounds that it cannot give proper moral value to actions done for friends and family members. 

IV. Conclusion
Care ethicists have objected to the impartiality in Kantian moral theory. In this vein, Virginia Held has argued that the impartiality in Kantian moral theory requires parents not to take into consideration that fact that their child is their child when making moral decisions. I have argued that the impartiality in Kantian moral theory does not require this, particularly from parents. In fact, parents have duties to their children precisely because their children are their children. From the particular worry that Held raises, though, we can see the larger concern of care ethicists generally—that the demands of impartiality in Kantian moral theory require family members and friends to give equal treatment to their family, friends, and strangers. That is, the impartiality in Kantian moral theory prevents us from treating family and friends in ways that show that the individuals in these relationships with us and the relationships themselves matter to us. Because Kantian moral theory is an impartial moral theory, the claim goes, such actions may be morally permissible but they do not have moral value.
	I have argued that actions done because of these relationships do have moral value in Kantian moral theory. Because the relationships we have with others are ends, the categorical imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End, properly understood, requires us to act to promote the ends of others. Furthermore, such actions are shaped by the context of our relationships within which the actions take place. Showing proper respect for individuals requires us to take those relationships into account and to shape our actions in such a way that shows the individuals in relationships with us that they and our relationships are important to us. In this way, the actions done in the context of personal relationships and how the individuals involved in them treat each other is similar in care ethics and in Kantian moral theory. Though Kantian moral theory and care ethics emphasize different reasons for acting—Kantian moral theory emphasizes the categorical imperative and our duty to respect all individuals, and care ethics emphasizes the value of the relationships and care given in them—both theories give moral value to caring actions done in personal relationships because of the relationship itself and the connection between the individuals in that relationship. 

Notes
Thank you to an anonymous reviewer and Diana T. Meyers for their helpful suggestions and comments. Thanks are also due to Britt Johnson, who read and commented on various drafts of this paper, and to Devora Shapiro and the attendees of FEAST 2007 for helpful comments and engaging conversation about an earlier version of this paper. 
1 I do not mean to restrict the definition of “family” to those of biological relation or the nuclear family as traditionally understood. I mean only to point out close, caring relationships between individuals who are intimately involved in each other’s lives. 
2 For a discussion of impartiality as requiring equal treatment, see Cottingham, John. 1983. Ethics and impartiality. Philosophical Studies 43: 83-99. For a discussion of impartiality as requiring equal consideration, see Kekes, John. 1981. Morality and impartiality. American Philosophical Quarterly 18: 295-303.
3 Rita Manning (1992, 2-3) and Joan Tronto (1993, 26-27) have also objected to the impartiality in Kantian moral theory. 
4 Thomas E. Hill, Jr. also argues that the impartiality in Kantian moral theory is meant to help us derive moral principles rather than to help us determine correct actions in particular situations. See Hill, Jr. (2002, 13-36) and Hill, Jr. (1991, 43-51). 
5 Other Kantians have focused their arguments on the fact that actions done for family and friends are morally permissible. Baron (1995, 117-145) and Herman (1993a, 1-44, especially 33) have both argued that acting on motives of love is permissible as long as such actions are constrained by the secondary motive of duty. For further discussion of their responses and why such responses are unsatisfactory, see (Bramer 2008, 49-56).
6 Kant discusses duties of parents to children, duties of spouses, and duties of friends in the Metaphysics of morals. The discussion of the duties of parents to children can be found at 6:280-283. His discuss of the duties of spouses to each other can be found at 6:277-280, and he discusses duties between friends at 6:469-6:474).
7 For a discussion of Kantian moral theory as giving us guiding principles rather than absolute rules, see Hill, Jr. (2002, 26-27). For discussions of the theory as a requiring an ongoing commitment to moral principles rather than following rules, see O’Neill (2002), Baron (1995, 117-145) and Herman (1993b, 23-44 and 184-207).
8 As O’Neill (2002, 338) and Louden (2000, 169) point out, practical judgment in matters of moral action is important for Kant. Judgment is what helps us to apply general principles to concrete cases in a way that takes account of “the carried realities and vulnerabilities of human life” (O’Neill 2002, 238)
9 For interpretation and discussion of Kantian duties between spouses, see Brake (2005), Kneller (2006), Denis (2001) and Herman (1993a). For interpretation and discussion of Kantian duties between friends, see Denis (2001), and Paton (1993).
10 Held addresses the question of global caring in her latest book, as well as in previous work. See (Held 2005, 157), (Held 1987, 118). Joan Tronto has addressed the question of care and global issues, most recently in her presentation at FEAST 2007 in a paper entitled, “Responsibility and Care: A Framework for Thinking about Immigration?” as well as in her previous work. See (Tronto, 1993, 109-110 and 137). Rita Manning is also currently working on the connection between global issues and care in her recent work ("Toward a Global Politics of Care" presented at the Ethics Center of Lock Haven University in October 2005; see also Manning 1992, 69-72). 
11 Held discusses the possibility of caring relations with those in distant countries (2007, 157 and 1987, 118). Tronto also discusses the need to care for individuals who are not necessarily a part of our inner circle (1993, 109-110, 137, 171-172).
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